India-China Standoff: An Indian View
After getting independence in 1947 from British-colonial rule, India started a jovial relationship with China. However, with the Chinese annexation of Tibet, this relationship went downhill and started exacerbating rapidly which later on led to a full-blown war in 1962. The major part of the border is yet to be settled, and as Tanvi Madan wrote in her latest piece, "remains a constant source of friction since then[1962]". Before delving into the present events, it is important to go back into history and look for the events that led to popping up of such friction points and if it was possible to avoid the war of 1962 and several skirmishes between India and China?
Formula Menon
Long before the war of 1962, Menon was the only man in the government of India arguing about the negotiated border settlement with China but no one was ready for such a swap. His critics included ABV, Morarji Desai, Acharya Kriplani, and Ram Manohar Lohia. In 1960, when Zhao Enlai came to India for the border settlement talks, Menon was kept out of the negotiations and ultimately the negotiations fall. However, in 2003, ABV signed an agreement with Beijing on his trip to China to set up special representatives on both sides to work out a negotiated settlement of the Border. Many historians believed that had India applied Menon's formula, the 1962 war might have been avoided and the geopolitics of the subcontinent would be in an absolutely different shape.
2013 & Race of Infrastructure Development
It is suggested by several analysts that the construction of G219 was started in the 1950s and only on discovering China's occupation of Aksai Chin in the late 1958-59 that India discovered this highway connecting Lhasa to Kashgar. Running parallel to LAC, G219 passes through Akshai China, and for several decades this highway was nothing more than a gravel-track. However, in 2013, China blacktopped it and increased its width to improve the mobilization of troops & logistics in the area.
Almost during the same time, India also stepped up its game in the construction of an all-weather DSDBO road that goes all the way to the Karakoram Pass which made the Chinese anxious & brought mortal fear to Pakistan, for on the left of Karakoram Pass lies Pakistan Occupied Kashmir while on the right sits Aksai Chin. And, quality connectivity for Indian Troops to the base of the Karakoram Pass also provides immediate access to the Indian Army to G219. 225 Km long DSDBO also gives luxury to India for launching a successful military operation in the near future on PoK while cutting the supply lines of Pakistan from China by dominating Karakoram pass. DBO also houses an airstrip which was revived in late 2008 by the Indian Airforce and in 2013, an Indian heavyweight C-130J Hercules landed on the DBO Advance Landing Ground, as it is called in military terms. And, several former Army personnel suggested that India's aggressive infrastructure development is the key reason behind back-to-back standoffs since 2013's Depsang stand-off. Another key reason for the current standoff is the Home Minister Amit Shah's overt admission of the intent of taking over PoK & Aksai Chin in the Parliament of India and DSDBO road gives this opportunity to the government & the armed forces of India. Although India & China managed to keep the dialogue session open even after the Galwan Clash, it is very difficult to say how and when this standoff will come to an end, for India have already declared that under no circumstances will it stop its infrastructure development along the LAC.
An Overt Indian Opinion
As far as the current standoff is concerned, the Indian Armed Forces are well prepared to tackle any misadventure of Chinese. Several reports flooded out in recent weeks showing the high morale of Indian forces and the combat readiness in terms of logistics and men power. Considering India's continuous deployment in Siachen, an Indian General states"we have become specialists at the high altitude fighting-probably the best in the world". Moreover, in the context of Gebirgskrieg (Military term for high altitude warfare that goes back to its time of emergence & the kind of terrain), Ravi Baghel & Marcus Nusser observed in their paper titled "Securing the heights" that, "Siachen is now better understood as a training ground for a future war in vertical terrain". So, Ladakh is more of a tropical terrain for the Indian Army that owns the experience of being deployed in Siachen while the Chinese never stayed at such altitudes in weather post-November. Moreover, the India of 2020 is absolutely different from the India of 1962.
While we will tackle the Chinese in Ladakh but we need to gear up for the future, Ladakh-stand off revealed several weaknesses on our side, and we should fix them so that in the future stand-offs we should be in a much stronger position.
Firstly, establishing a new cadre of civilian bureaucrats that work closely with MoD & their decision-making pattern should match that of army personnel while acknowledging the limitation posed by the rules & regulations of the government & international conventions on the issue. Political, Diplomatic & Military entities have a different point of view on the border. Now, in the case of Macmohan line, it is drawn in a way that it goes from a trig height to a trig-height, and for diplomat and politician that might be the line but for Military personnel to defend that line, he or she will want to sit on the top of the ridgeline. Now, if you will leave that ridgeline then the adversary army will come and occupy it as it happened in the case of Thangla Ridge Line. So several lines on the McMohan line are drawn on the watershed and for diplomats, it is just height but for the military, it is an advantage over the enemy and the high grounds that they need to occupy in order to defend the region. So, as a result, as Indian Army General and former commander of 14 Corps, Lt Gen PJS Pannu said in one of his interviews the military "wants to sit on the top of the watershed", which makes an absolute sense. Hence, in order to minimize this difference of perception between a diplomat drawing the line & an army general defending that line, we need the manpower which understands the limitations and perspectives of all those who are on the ground defending the land and that of the diplomat clan.
Now, Ladakh is a land of passes and whoever controls the passes controls the smooth access to lands on the opposite side. In this scenario, most of the passes are held by Chinese, so India should not shy away from strengthening its position over the rest of the passes. This brings to the second suggestion of the need of India to overtly state an aggressive Border Management Policy along LAC as well as LoC. While acknowledging the need for peace in the region, India should fortify its defenses in the territory and increase ISR in the region no matter the cost. As Marcus Aurelius said," The impediment to action advances action. whatever stands in the way becomes the way.", India too needs to advance, and while strengthening itself militarily, we should aggressively use soft-diplomatic powers to concrete bilateral ties with the south-Asian neighbors and the countries in the IOR.
